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THE "RIGHT OF SILENCE" IN JAPANESE LAW
B. J. GEORGE, Jr.*
INTRODUCTION
There are three great watersheds in the development of Japanese
law: the reception of Chinese legal ideas in the eighth to tenth cen-
turies,1 the adoption of Western European codes between 1880 and
1920,2 and the importation of Anglo-American concepts after World
War II. The reception of ideas from the common law system may
eventually have as great an impact on the Japanese legal system as the
earlier importations and adaptations. Some of the legal innovations
imposed by SCAP, such as the laws regulating monopolies,3 have had a
substantially different impact than SCAP officials contemplated. Oth-
ers, such as the creation of an independent judiciary,4 are so well estab-
lished that probably nothing short of revolution or invasion will over-
throw them. A few are still in the process of useful adaptation to the
whole of the Japanese judicial and legal system. Among the latter, the
right of silence (mokuziken) and its companion, the right to refuse to
answer specific questions (shkgen kyozetsuken), are prime examples.
The concept of a right of silence, particularly in the case of an
accused person, was totally unknown in traditional Japanese law.
Tokugawa procedure made no clear-cut distinction between civil and
criminal or judicial and administrative proceedings; those embroiled
in disputes were expected, indeed required, to make full revelation of
everything which bore on the propriety of their activity.' In what
today would be a criminal proceeding, the defendant was expected to
respond to questioning; and he could be tortured until he made the
requisite statement.' During the first decade or two of the Meiji period
(1868-1912) some changes were made; the use of torture as an investi-
* Associate Director, Practicing Law Institute. B.A. 1949, J.D. 1951, University of
Michigan.1 R. ISHII, JAPANESE LEGISLATION IN THE MEIJI ERA 4-7 (Chambliss trans. 1958)
[hereinafter cited as ISHII] ; Y. NODA, INTRODUCTION AU DROIT JAPONAIS 32-36 (1966).
'ISHII 9-11; NODA, supra note 1, at 49-69.
'Cf. Ariga & Rieke, The Antinonopoly Law of Japan and Its Enforcement, 39
WASH. L. REv. 437 (1964).
"See J. MAKI, COURT AND CONSTITUTION IN JAPAN xviii-xix, xxxix-xlvi (1964).
'See, e.g., 1 D. HENDERSON, CONCILIATION AND JAPANESE LAW 128-67 (1965) for
an illustrative case, a translation of a matter which would be viewed as civil in nature
today.
'IsHII 321-25; Abe, Self-Incrimination-Japan and the United States, 46 J. CRIM.
L.C. & P.S. 613-16 (1956).
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gative device was prohibited and evidence other than a confession had
to be adduced before a conviction could be entered.7
With this background, it was understandable that first French and
then German criminal procedure codes were used as the models for the
Codes of Criminal Procedure of 1890 and 1922. French and German
law contemplated three stages in procedure: (1) investigation by police
and public procurator; (2) judicial investigation by a special investi-
gating magistrate (juge d'instruction; Untersuchungrichter) based
on documents collected and forwarded by administrative officials, ter-
minating in a decision whether to move the case on to the full court for
trial; and (3) trial itself, conducted initially on the basis of the docu-
ments already examined by the investigating magistrate.' No break
with Japanese traditions was required in order to adopt a foreign code
under which the "suspect" (higisha) in the first stage and the "ac-
cused" (hikokunin) in the second stage constituted a primary source of
information and proof. Accordingly, the public procurator could sum-
mon the suspect, or other person having information, to his office for
questioning.' The suspect was under no enforceable duty to answer
during this first stage.1 ° During the second stage the powers of the
investigating magistrate were greater; he had the duty to question the
accused and could not terminate the preliminary investigation until he
had done so. 1 At the trial of the case, if the examining magistrate for-
warded the matter for trial, the court was again empowered to ask
the defendant about the circumstances of the case and about his
responses to the material adduced against him.12
The new Constitution of 1946 required that these procedures be
changed. Article 38(1) provides that "no person shall be compelled to
testify against himself" (nambito mo, jiko ni Jurieki na kydjutsu o
kydyd sarenai). The pattern for this provision quite clearly is the fifth
amendment of the United States Constitution and its state counter-
IsHII 324; S. DANDO, THE JAPANESE LAW OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 14 (George
trans. 1965) [hereinafter cited as DANDO].
'See Keedy, The Preliminary Inzestigation of Crine in France, 88 U. PA. L. REv.
385, 692, 915 (1940) ; Ploscowe, The Investigating Magistrate (luge D'instruction) in
European Criminal Procedure, 33 MICH. L. REv. 1010 (1935) ; Schmidt, Introduction
to 10 THE AMERICAN SERIES OF FOREIGN PENAL CODES: THE GERMA.N CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE CODE 1-4, 10-13, 18-19 (Niebler trans. 1965).
'JAPANESE CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE OF 1922 art. 253.
"S. Oqo, KEIJISOSHOH6 K6GI (Lectures on the law of criminal procedure) 356-57,
390-91 (1933).
" JAPANESE CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE OF 1922 art. 300; see ONo, supra note 10,
at 398-99. Similar provisions had been contained in Article 93 of the JAPANESE CODE
OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE OF 1890.
' JAPANESE CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE OF 1922 arts. 338, 339, 345, 347. See ONO,
supra note 10, at 450-51.
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parts. 13 It is evident that the law relating to privilege against self-
incrimination is developing its own special form in Japan, although
Japanese decisions since 1946 reflect American law in many respects.
I. "WITNESS" VS. "DEFENDANT" PRIVILEGE
Privilege doctrine in American law usually stresses the difference
between the defendant privilege and the witness privilege. The former
prohibits the defendant in a criminal case from being called at the
instance of the state. The privilege is waived through the defendant's
electing to become a witness in his own behalf. By the latter, the wit-
ness can only refuse to answer specific questions that are incriminating.
Waiver through volunteered answers extends only to the subject matter
opened up by the particular question. 4
Under Japanese law, however, the distinction is usually drawn in
terms of the right to remain absolutely silent, as contrasted with the
right to refuse to answer specific questions. The primary reason for
stating the issue in this way is that under the present Code of Criminal
Procedure the defendant is not considered competent as a witness.' 5
This in turn is part of a broader premise, reminiscent of Anglo-Amer-
ican law down to the early nineteenth century, that parties to litigation
are not competent as witnesses.' 6 This means that the defendant can-
not be asked to give "testimony" in the formal sense, cannot be sub-
jected to the other requirements applicable to an ordinary witness,'
and cannot be prosecuted for the crime of perjury for any false state-
ments he may choose to make.' In one sense, therefore, Article 311 (1)
rests more on the premise of want of witness competency than it does
on the concept of a defendant privilege.
"See generally 1 HOGAKU KY6KAI (Jurisprudence Association), CHaSHAKU
NIHONKOKU KEMP6 (Commentary on the Constitution of Japan) 659-64 (1953);
KEUI rnGAKU JITEN (Encyclopedia of criminal law and procedure) 759 (T. Takikawa
ed. 2d ed. 1962) ; K IJIH6 JITEN (Encyclopedia of criminal law and procedure) 250-51
(R. Hirano, K. Naito & H. Tamiya ed. 1961); M. KATsURA & S. TAKEDA, MoKu-
HIKEN TO SH6OGEN KYOZETSU KEN (The right to silence and the right to withhold evi-
dence), in 9 KEuisosH6H6, S6G6 HANREI KENKYU S6SHO (Comprehensive case study
series: criminal procedure law) (1961) [hereinafter KATSURA & TAKEDA]; Tamiya,
Hikokunin to higisha no mokulhiken (The accused's and suspect's right of silence) in 1
KEUIsosH6H6 KOZA (Collected essays on the law of criminal procedure) 71 (1963)
[hereinafter cited as Tamiya].
" C. McCoRmIcK, EVIDENCE 257-59 (1954) [hereinafter cited as MCCORMICK] ; 8 J.
WI oMoE, EVIDENCE §§ 2252, 2268 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
"See DANDO 278.
'" McCORMICK 142; 2 J. WiGmoRE, EVIDENCE § 575 (3d ed. 1940).1 TJAPANESE CODE O CRI MINAL PROCEDURE [hereinafter cited as CODE] art. 154;
JAPANESE RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE [hereinafter cited as RULES] arts. 117-20.
1Cf. KATsuRA & TAKEDA 73-75. He can, however, be guilty of suborning perjury
or slander on the basis of his statements in court.
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II. PROCEEDINGS IN WHICH PRIVILEGE MAY BE CLAIMED
By its terms Article 38(1) is not limited to criminal cases. It can be
invoked by witnesses in criminal or civil proceedings. 9 Presently there
is no direct basis for constitutional litigation in either instance, because
both the civil and criminal procedure codes guarantee a statutory right
to refuse to testify. Article 146 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
permits any person to refuse to answer any question that may incrimi-
nate him." Article 311 (1) of the same code states that the defendant
may remain silent throughout the proceedings or may refuse to answer
specific questions. 21 Article 280 of the Code of Civil Procedure gives
any witness a right to decline to answer incriminating questions. 2
2
Because of these statutory bases for refusal to answer, an improper
ruling on a claim of privilege is treated as a statutory, rather than con-
stitutional, violation.
However, the statutes may not cover formal administrative proceed-
ings and hearings conducted by legislative committees. There is rela-
tively little case law outside of the special problem areas of tax mat-
ters, customs enforcement, alien registration, narcotics control and
traffic enforcement, all of which will be discussed below.23 The con-
census of scholarly opinion, however, is that witnesses in nonjudicial
proceedings can claim privilege.24
Two additional problems have aroused much dispute and continue to
split commentators into opposing camps. The first is whether the so-
called "opening proceedings" (bit5 tetsuzuki), in which the presiding
judge questions the defendant as to his identity before having the in-
formation read aloud and warns him of his right to remain silent,2
requires the defendant to incriminate himself. Some scholars maintain
that to ask the defendant his name, age and place of residence impairs
his "right to remain silent at all times," and therefore violates Article
38(1). However, the weight of decisions, supported by some commen-
tators, holds that this questioning is solely for the purpose of establish-
ing that the person who is named as the defendant in the information
is the person actually before the court. Therefore, except in the rare
KATSURA & TAKEDA 7-13, 15-17; Tainiva 74.
oDANDo 280.
"1 Id. at 372.
-H. KANEKO, MINJI SOSH6H5 TAIKEI (System of civil procedure law) 256-57
(1967).
' See text pp. 1162-66 infra.
KATSURA & TAKEDA 15-23.
CODE art. 291 (reading of information (kisoj,) and warning of rights). See
DANDO 373; R. Hirano, Keijisoshohd (Law of criminal procedure), in 43 H6RITSU-
GAKU ZENSHO 178-79 (1958).
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instance in which acknowledgment of identity as the person charged is
tantamount to an acknowledgment of guilt, there is no violation of
privilege in asking these matters of the accused."
The second 'related problem concerns the constitutional validity
under Article 38(1) of certain other provisions of the Code of Criminal
Procedure that require the defendant to identify himself. The defend-
ant is required to give his name, age and residence in such procedural
contexts as the determination of whether or not to hold him in deten-
tion, 7 a motion for indication of reasons for detertion, 8 a notice of
appointment of counsel retained by the defendant,29 and a statement
of grounds advanced on appeal. 30 In several instances defendants have
refused to include this personal information, and as a consequence the
court has rejected the application or other document in question. In
each instance the appellate court has sustained the lower court, giving
rise to considerable scholarly criticism.
31
III. WARNING OF RIGHTS
Neither a constitutional nor a statutory privilege is likely to mean
much unless some notice of its existence is given to the person entitled
to exercise it. In American constitutional law the question of notice
has arisen only in the context of interrogation, a matter discussed
below.32 This is primarily because the defendant privilege prohibits
the prosecution or the court from asking anything at all of the defend-
ant until and unless he has taken the stand to testify on his own behalf
after the prosecution has concluded its case-in-chief, and witnesses are
are assumed to know that they do not have to incriminate themselves.
Except in the confessions area, the tendency has been not to impose
new warning requirements to benefit witnesses who may well become
defendants, but instead to extend the defendant privilege to cover
formal investigative procedures like grand jury proceedings, 33 juvenile
See, e.g., KATsuRA & TAKEDA 32-34; KEMaP6 CHOSAKAI, KEmP6 UNY6 NO JISSAI
NI TSUITE NO CH6SA HOKOTJSHO (fuzokubunsho dai 3-g6) (Report on the Commission
on the Constitution, Supplement No. 3, on actual application of the Constitution) 340
(1964). See also soprces cited in DANDO, SHINKEUISoSH6H6 I(6Y6 (Treatise on the
new criminal procedure law) 109, n.6 (7th ed. 1967).
.- CODE arts. 60-61; DANDo 257-58.
CODE arts. 82-87; RULES arts. 81-86, art. 86-1, art. 86-2; DAND0 259-61.
CODE art. 78; DANDo 258-59.
CODE art. 376; DANDO 423-24.
'See KATStRA & TAKEDA 32-45 and authorities cited therein.
"See text pp. 1158-59 infra.
'See, e.g., Gardner v. Broderick, 36 U.S.L.W. 4536 (June 10, 1968); People v.
Calhoun, 50 Cal. 2d 137, 323 P.2d 427 (1958); People v. DeFeo, 308 N.Y. 595, 127
N.E.2d 592 (1955) ; People v. Smith, 257 Mich. 319, 241 N.W. 186 (1932).
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delinquency adjudication proceedings3" and quasi-criminal administra-
tive investigations.3 5
In Japan, the Code of Criminal Procedure requires that the public
prosecutor or judicial police officer who has requested a suspect to
appear for an interview first inform the suspect that he may decline to
answer questions.36 As already indicated, the defendant at the time of
opening proceedings must be warned that he has the right either to re-
main absolutely silent or to refuse to respond to specific questions.
The Rules of Criminal Procedure also require that a witness in a for-
mal judicial proceeding be warned that he may refuse to give any testi-
mony that may lead to his prosecution or conviction.3" Thus, the
warning requirements under Japanese statute law are more extensive
than under American law. However, the public prosecutor who sum-
mons an informant who is not a suspect into his office for an interview39
or the judicial police officer or public prosecutor who has custody of a
suspect after execution of an arrest warrant,4" is under no statutory
obligation to warn about privilege. Nor is any warning required by
statutes authorizing administrative investigations.
If there is no statutory requirement that a warning be given, and a
witness or informant makes a statement that later proves to be incrim-
inating, the question has arisen whether a violation of Constitution
Article 38(1) has occurred. To date, the Japanese courts have ruled
that there is no constitutional violation if a warning is not given; the
prescribing of warnings is deemed to be exclusively a legislative mat-
ter. On this basis, even the failure to comply with statutory require-
ments of warning does not present a constitutional issue; but if it
affects the validity of the judgment in the case, it may constitute a
statutory ground for reversing the case on appeal."
IV. WAIVER OR RELINQUISHMENT OF RIGHTS
As indicated earlier, the fact that the defendant under Japanese law
"In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
Uniformed Sanitation Men Ass'n v. Comm'r of Sanitation, 36 U.S.L.W. 4534
(June 10, 1968) ; Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967). See also Camara v.
Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967), and See v. Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967), apply-
ing search and seizure limitations of U.S. CONST. amend. IV to administrative searches.
" CODE art. 198(2). See DANDO 306.
"CODE art. 291(2). See DANDO 372.
" RULES art. 121(1), supplementing CODE art. 146. The privilege against incriminat-
ing close relatives is also covered; CODE art. 147. RULES art. 121(2) requires that
notice also be given to persons who may be able to assert one of the professional
privileges authorized by CODE art. 149.
" CODE art. 223.
" CODE arts. 203-05.
" See authorities gathered in KATSURA & TAKEDA 86-104, and in Tamiya 78-79.
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cannot become a witness in any formal sense makes it difficult to iden-
tify a "defendant" privilege distinct from a "witness" privilege. Also,
under Japanese procedure there is not a clear, definite procedural break
between presentation of the government's case and the opportunity to
present material in defense. 2 As a consequence there is no clearly
developed doctrine of waiver of privilege corresponding to that in the
United States.3
There is, however, a functional equivalent to waiver in the case of a
defendant. Article 311(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure states
that the defendant may remain silent. But article 311(2) provides that
if the defendant does choose to volunteer an unsworn statement, the
presiding judge may at any time thereafter question him about "nec-
essary matters" (hitsuyi to suru jik6). Article 311(3) extends the
same power to an associate judge, public prosecutor, defense counsel,
co-defendant or co-defendant's counsel if he first notifies the presiding
judge of his desire to question. A similar result occurs under American
procedure if the defendant takes the stand and "waives" his privilege,
since no legal error is then committed by a prosecuting attorney, judge
or co-defendant's attorney who questions the defendant.
However, the Japanese defendant still retains the right to refuse to
answer any specific questions.44 Because he is not a "witness" he can-
not in any event be visited with the penalties provided in the Code for
improper refusal to testify.3 Therefore, he can lapse into protected
silence at any time. The effect of "waiver" consequently is limited to
the court's use of his volunteered statements as data leading to a con-
clusion of guilt.4"
V. PROBLEMS OF INTERPRETATION
Three problems of interpretation are presented by the language of
Article 38(1) itself: (1) What is the disadvantage (furieki) that the
Constitution is intended to protect the citizen against? (2) What
amounts to a declaration or statement (kytjutsu) that cannot be ex-
acted? (3) What constitutes the forbidden compulsion (kyjyj)?
A. Disadvantage
The Japanese text creates somewhat greater problems of interpreta-
"See CODE arts. 292-312; DANDO 372-76.
' McCoRmicK 272-76.
" DANDO 100-01.
' CODE arts. 150-51, 160-61; DANDO 279-81.
"See generally KATSURA & TAKEDA 11, 85; F. AOYANAGr, KEIJIsoSHOH6 TSURON
(Outline of the law of criminal procedure) 579-80 (1962).
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tion than does the typical American constitutional provision. Despite
the official English translation which uses the phrase "against him-
self," the Japanese term is furieki, which has a broader implication of
"disadvantageous in general" than does the English phrase "testify
against one's self." Nevertheless, the jurisprudence of both countries
permits analysis on the basis of two questions: (a) what constitutes an
incriminating statement, and (b) what is a penalty?
The test for incrimination under United States Supreme Court au-
thority,4 7 which is binding on the states under the fourteenth amend-
ment due process clause,48 is that:49
To sustain the privilege, it need only be evident from the implications of
the question, in the setting in which it is asked, that a responsive answer
to the question or an explanation of why it cannot be answered might be
dangerous because injurious disclosure could result.
The Japanese expression is interpreted to mean "facts that give rise to
a fear that criminal liability may be imposed on the individual" (jiko
ga keijiji no sekinin o towareru osore aru jikj)."° This is taken to in-
clude not only facts tending to establish the material elements of the
offense, but also factors that justify an increase in the weight of the
penalties assessed. This view is explainable in part by the fact that
Article 121(1) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, in aid of Article
146 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which in turn restates Consti-
tution Article 38(1), comprehends both fear of prosecution (keijiso-
tsui) and fear of receiving a judgment of guilt (yfizaihanketsu);
aggravating factors are to be expressly dealt with in the portion of the
court's judgment relating to penalties.3 1
If the material elicited is incriminating according to these tests and
obtained under "compulsion" and without a valid waiver of rights, it
cannot be used in any aspect of the criminal case. If it is nevertheless
used, a ground for reversal exists. 2 The American cases, however, go
7 Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479 (1951).
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
341 U.S. at 487.
Japan v. Kumagai, 11 Saik6 saibansho keiji hanreishfi [hereinafter cited as Kei-
shfi] 802, 805 (Feb. 20, 1957). See also KATSURA & TAKEDA 24, 40-45.
CODE art. 335(2). See DANDO 237-38, 385; Tamiya 85.
A derivative evidence rule is apparently part of the American privilege concept,
Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 79 (1964), so that if other evidence is
discovered as a result of the compelled statement it must be excluded as well. See
generally George, Tie Fruits of Miranda: Scope of the Exclusionary Rule, 39 COLO.
L. REV. 478 (1967). Japanese courts, however, do not at present apply the requirement
of exclusion to anything other than the compelled statement itself.
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further to include loss of employment" and disbarment54 as prohibited
"penalties" within the fifth amendment. Civil liability is not included
within the concept of penalty.
Under the Japanese Constitution, disadvantage (Jurieki) in a broad
sense might comprehend loss of property, impairment of reputation or
revocation of a permit or license to engage in a certain occupation or
activity. To date, however, civil liability and impaired reputation have
not been included by interpretation within the definition of furieki,
though Article 280 of the Code of Civil Procedure permits a witness to
decline to answer questions that may bring disgrace (chijoku) to him
or persons in certain specified close relationships.5 Problems arising
from revocation of permits and the like will be discussed in greater
detail below. 6
A specialized problem of forbidden use of unlawfully extracted in-
criminating material is the invocation of a presumption that silence
means guilt. In the American context, this has arisen in connection
with comments on the defendant's silence by prosecutor, judge or even
defense counsel.5 The United States Supreme Court has held that it is
a prohibited impairment of the privilege against self-incrimination as
incorporated into the fourteenth amendment for the prosecutor to com-
ment on the defendant's failure to take the witness stand on his own
behalf,58 and this no doubt will be taken to prohibit all comment by
anyone: At the present time, however, there is no bar against using an
inference if a witness claims privilege against giving testimony.
A comparative evaluation of the Japanese system is rendered diffi-
cult because the jury is not used in Japan;5  manifestly no body of
law has developed to govern formal instructions of law and arguments
that may properly be submitted to lay jurors. Of course, the parties do
conclude the proof process by presenting their views both on law and
'Uniformed Sanitation Men Ass'n v. Comm'r of Sanitation, 36 U.S.L.W. 4534
(June 10, 1968) ; Gardner v. Broderick, 36 U.S.L.W. 4536 (June 10, 1968) ; cf. Sloch-
ower v. Board of Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956).
r'Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (1967).
r' There is no equivalent provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure. However,
physical examinations are to be conducted so as not to injure the reputation of the
person examined. CODE art. 131(2).
' See text pp. 1163-65 infra.
' McCoMICK 276-81.
' Griffin v. California, 3$0 U.S. 609 (1965). Only if the court finds beyond a rea-
sonable doubt that the error was harmless can comment be ignored. Chapman v. Cali-
fornia, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). The Washington Supreme Court has held that if a prose-
cutor questions a witness who he knows will invoke the privilege, this is error because
it denies the defendant his right of confrontation. State v. Nelson, 72 Wash. Dec. 2d
269, 432 P.2d 857 (1967).
'See DANDO 18, 41.
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fact,6" and so might comment on the defendant's claim of privilege
either to remain silent or to refuse to answer specific questions. Some
authority holds that if this occurs and is reflected in the court's judg-
ment, it is error. 1 However, it is not treated as an error of constitu-
tional dimensions, but rather as an abuse of the judges' power to
evaluate the evidence freely in reaching their determination.6 2 If noth-
ing is said about the matter in the reasons stated for the judgment, it
is probably as futile to speculate whether in fact the judges' reasoning
was affected by the fact that the defendant failed to disclaim responsi-
bility as it is when an American lay jury is involved.
B. Declaration or Statement
The problem of what amounts to the "testimony" or "statements"
(kyijutsu) that cannot be compelled is common to both systems.
Under the American concept of privilege, it has been clear for a long
while that any oral statement that is "compelled" and any documents
required to be produced under court order are clearly within the cov-
erage of the privilege. It has not been so clear, however, whether
tangible evidence and physical evidence obtained from an individual's
person are within the coverage of the privilege. This has constituted no
real problem as far as taking property from the person or presence of
a person is concerned, because the propriety of that conduct has been
tested under the constitutional search and seizure provisions. 3 The
search and seizure decisions, however, did not comfortably cover pro-
cedures like blood-testing, breath-testing, fingerprinting, photograph-
ing, lineups, and voice or handwriting tests. The Rochin decision64
which brought extremely calloused methods of exacting evidence from
the body within fourteenth amendment due process was very little
availed of in federal and state courts.65 As a result, cases and com-
mentators were split badly over the application of self-incrimination
to demonstrative evidence.
A series of recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court has
at least temporarily settled the matter, by holding that the privilege
against self-incrimination does not apply to blood-test evidence,6
' Code art. 293; RULES arts. 211-12; DANDO 376.
"See KATSURA & TAKEDA 68-71; Tamiya 83-87.
12 See CODE art. 318; DANDO 203-07.
'U.S. CONST. amend. IV; Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
" Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
'See, e.g., Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954) ; Blackford v. United States,
247 F.2d 745 (9th Cir. 1957) ; cf. People v. Speaks, 156 Cal. App. 2d 25, 319 P.2d 709
(1958).
' Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) ; Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432
(1957).
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courtroom identification procedures,67 fingerprinting, photographing
and lineup procedures,68 and handwriting exemplars.6 Since these
decisions were all decided by a bare majority of the Court, changes in
Court personnel may bring a reversal in or modification of this doc-
trine. Furthermore, the decisions leave open the question of whether
it is proper to question a defendant or suspect as part of an expert
examination. The polygraph is not a recognized form of adducing evi-
dence for use in American courts,70 and narcoanalysis has been
prevented in the context of confessions.71 However, psychiatric exami-
nations involve questioning the subject about both acts and attitudes
that bear on criminal charges, and on occasion hypnosis or narcoanal-
ysis may be used as a diagnostic technique. If subsequent efforts should
be made to use the subject's statements as incriminating admissions,
they almost certainly would be rejected on the grounds that the exam-
ination was under court order and the answers were thus "compelled"
in violation of the privilege,71a or conducted in violation of the rules
regulating the obtaining of confessions, including requirements of
voluntariness. If, however, the expert bases an otherwise relevant
opinion on the defendant's or subject's statements plus all the other
techniques of analysis and diagnosis, there probably is no "privilege
against self-incrimination" problem. 2
A somewhat parallel analysis is to be found in the Japanese legal
'Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245 (1910), cited with approval in Schmerber v.
United States, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967). However, lineups were subjected to
a special application of the sixth amendment right to counsel in Wade; Stovall v.
Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967), applies a due process standard of fairness to lineups con-
ducted before the effective date of the Wade doctrine.
' Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967).
" McCoRiacK 369-73; Skolnick, Scientific Theory and Scientific Evidence: An
Analysis of Lie-Detection, 70 Y.LE L.J. 694 (1961).7 Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556 (1954). See Dession, Freedman, Donnelly & Red-
lich, Drug-Induced Revelation and Criminal Investigation, 62 YALE L.J. 315 (1953).
a See Simmons v. United States, 88 S. Ct. 967 (1968), in which the Court held
that it was a violation of fifth amendment privilege to use as a party admission at the
trial statements about possession made by the defendant in testifying to his standing
on an unsuccessful motion to suppress evidence. The Court stated:
Thus, in this case Garrett was obliged either to give up what he believed, with
advice of counsel, to be a valid Fourth Amendment claim or, in legal effect, to
waive his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. In these circum-
stances, we find it intolerable that one constitutional right should have to be
surrendered in order to assert another.
Id. at 976.
"' People v. Williams, - Ill. 2d - , 231 N.E.2d 646 (1967). Under a new com-
petence to stand trial statute in Michigan, material used in the psychiatric evaluation
cannot be submitted on any other issue but competence. Micx. STAT. ANN. § 28.966
(11) (4) (Supp. 1967).
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literature.13 If under a warrant authorizing a physical or mental exami-
nation, the defendantC4 was asked various questions about the activity
underlying the criminal charges and the contents of his statements
were offered as a confession, it would approach or constitute a forbid-
den extraction of incriminating testimony. In general, however, physi-
cal examinations, including blood, urine and breath tests for alcoholic
intake, fingerprint and handwriting comparisons, photography of the
defendant and many other forms of scientific forensic investigation are
not generally considered as within the privilege because they do not
involve declarations (kyjjutsu). Efforts to use narcoanalysis to obtain
a confession have been dealt with on the basis of the voluntariness of
the confession and not on the propriety of the investigative procedvre
itself. " . The status of polygraph examinations is not clear, but they
seem to be viewed as a form of scientific analysis and not as a means of
obtaining a confession. One may conclude that a psychiatric examina-
tion based on an interview with the defendant, even though ordered
under Article 167, is probably constitutional. In addition, it is prob-
able that an expert would be entitled to give his opinion in court and,
if necessary, recount portions of the defendant's statements that sup-
port his opinion if the court does not use these statements as admis-
sions or confessions but only as evidence supporting the expert's
opinion. Resolution of these issues, however, awaits further adjudica-
tion in both Japan and the United States.
C. Compulsion
The third issue involves the meaning of "compulsion" (kyjyj).
This, too, is a problem shared by the two national systems. Until 1966,
state and federal courts in the United States equated compulsion with
judicial process; it was the judicial subpoena to produce documents,
the court's approval of the prosecutor's request to summon the defend-
ant to the witness stand, or invocation of the threat to impose con-
tempt penalties if a witness persisted in his refusal to testify that con-
stituted the compulsion which made the evidence or testimony unusable
in a subsequent prosecution. Since the emphasis was on judicial mis-
conduct, and the defendant privilege was considered to arise only after
See KATSURA & TAKEDA 60-66; R. HIRANO, su pra note 25, at 107; Tamiya 79-80;
DANDO, supra note 26, at 256-57. The narcoanalysis problem can also be subsumed
under the problem of compulsion, and within the scope of coerced confessions violative
of Kemp6 (Constitution) art. 38 (2).
"* CODE art. 167; DANDo 284-85.
" State v. Kimura, 5 K6ta saibansho keiji hanreishfi 2049 (Tokyo High Ct., Sept.
4, 1952).
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formal charges, extrajudicial confessions were not viewed as within the
concept of privilege. If they were coerced7 6 or involuntary77 they were
inadmissible by virtue of due process requirements, and those require-
ments alone.
The Miranda decision 78 in 1966 and the decisions that followed it in
1967,)7 however, have drastically extended the coverage of the privi-
lege against self-incrimination to include those who are questioned in
police or other official custody or who are summoned during an admin-
istrative investigation. Because "the government seeking to punish an
individual [must] produce the evidence against him by its own inde-
pendent labors, rather than by the cruel, simple expedient of compell-
ing it from his own mouth," the privilege applies to "informal
compulsion exerted by law-enforcement officers during in-custody
questioning."' ° To insure that the suspect knows of his right, the Court
instituted requirements that the suspect be given warnings about the
coverage of the privilege and of the right to counsel, and that if the
suspect indicates a desire for counsel, all questioning be suspended
until counsel is actually present. Though the Court recognized that
waiver of both the privilege and the right to counsel is possible, it
placed a "heavy burden" on the prosecution "to demonstrate that the
defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against self-
incrimination and his right to retained or appointed counsel."'" It will
take years to litigate all the many issues that Miranda and Gault
raise, but it is eminently clear that the privilege concept will be radi-
cally expanded beyond its pre-1966 limits.
Japanese law corresponds closely with pre-Miranda American law.
The term kyjy, taken literally, can of course comprehend torture and
physical or mental coercion. But that aspect of evidence-gathering is
separately covered by the prohibition in Article 38 (2) of the Constitu-
tion against using in evidence confessions obtained through compul-
sion, torture or threat.8 2 Therefore, something different from this must
have been -intended under Article 38(1); because interrogation that
may violate Article 38(2) takes place almost exclusively outside of
"See, e.g., Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596 (1944); Chambers v. Florida, 309
U.S. 227 (1940) ; Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
'See, e.g., Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964) ; Haynes v. Washington, 373
U.S. 503 (1963); Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961).
" Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
'In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) ; Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967).0 384 U.S. at 460.
81384 U.S. at 475.
'See DANDO 196-97.
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formal proceedings, Article 38(1) is concerned mainly with formal
proceedings.
Thus, in the case of a witness in a criminal matter, the compulsion
is the penalty that can be imposed on him if he refuses to testify; 3 a
witness may claim privilege against self-incrimination or other eviden-
tiary privileges without fear of punishment, but an erroneous refusal to
permit the claim would result in the use of "compulsion" in the consti-
tutional sense.8' A clear-cut example would be calling a co-offender as
a witness after the case against him has been severed from the one in
which he is called. 5
In another setting, the question of compulsion is posed by the rejec-
tion of procedural documents or the taking of procedural steps adverse
to the defendant, such as denying bail, because of his failure or refusal
to file information demanded by a judge or public prosecutor. To date,
the only cases have been those noted earlier involving refusal to give
name, age and address in procedural documents. Because statements
containing this information have not been held to be incriminating, the
question of compulsion has not arisen. But it seems possible that under
some circumstances certain steps-e.g., termination of bail-based on a
defendant's refusal to make a statement would be viewed as a form of
compulsion.
Does fear of a perjury prosecution if a witness lies "compel" him to
give truthful but incriminating testimony? Conversely, does the fact
that truthful testimony will be incriminating justify the witness in
lying? In the instance of an ordinary witness the answer is clear. If the
truth is incriminating to the witness, or if it falls within some statutory
privilege 6 he is protected against having to reveal the truth. But he
does not have a privilege to testify falsely as an alternative to a claim
of privilege or in the absence of a statutory privilege. In the case of a
defendant, the problem is somewhat different because he cannot be-
come a witness and so is not in a position to commit the crime of
perjury even if he lies to the court. However, he can be prosecuted for
subornation of perjury or for slander to a third party. 7
Germs of Miranda in some fairly recent cases raise the question
'CODE arts. 160-6 1.
"See DANDo 279-81. In addition to the privilege against self-incrimination, wit-
nesses may claim privilege based on possession of official secrets (CODE arts. 144-45),
possible incrimination of others in a close personal relationship (CODE art. 147), or
receipt of information in a profession or counseling capacity (CODE art. 149; cf. CODE
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE arts. 280-81).
See KATSURA & TAKEDA 94-97.
'See note 84 supra.
'" See KATSURA & TAKEDA 73-75, and authorities cited therein.
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whether the privilege concept of Miranda will in time be imported into
Japanese law. For example, the Supreme Court has said that though
communication between a suspect and his attorney may be restricted
before the filing of formal charges,8" there can be no restriction after
such filing. Therefore, if the defendant has been formally accused on
one charge, no restricfons can be placed on the attorney-client contact
even though they are intended to facilitate investigation of an offense
with which the defendant has not yet been formally charged.89 The
Osaka High Court has also excluded a confession because the police
officer conducting the questioning refused to convey the suspect's re-
quest for an attorney to a bar association, as he is required to do by
law. 0 However, because Constitution Article 38(2) specifically covers
confessions, it is likely that any developments in the law of confessions
will take place as interpretations of that provision and Code Article
319, and not as expansions of privilege under Article 38(1).
VI. ADmiNISTRATivE REGULATIONS AND THE PRIVILEGE
Administrative regulations sometimes require the divulgence of in-
formation arguably within the privilege; a question is then raised
whether loss of some privilege or right, which may result from non-
compliance, can be viewed as compulsion under Article 38(1).
There is United States Supreme Court authority to the effect that
records required to be kept by law do not as such come within the
protection of the privilege against self-incrimination.0' However, if the
material sought is directly incriminating so that the very filing pro-
vides information helpful in proving state or federal criminal activity,
then privilege may properly be asserted and no prosecution can be
brought for failure to submit the information or register criminal
activity.92 Some cases also hold that under certain limited circum-
stances there may be comprehensive advance waiver of certain aspects
of privilege,93 and that a claim of privilege may itself be a sufficient
' CODE art. 39(3) ; see DANDO 109-10, 259.
'In re Kojima, HANREI JIH5 (No. 453) 3 (Sup. Ct., July 26, 1966). Cf. Massiah
v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
'Japan v. Unknown, HAXREI JIH5 (No. 228) 34 (Osaka High Ct., May 26, 1960).
"Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1 (1948) ; cf. Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511
(1967).
"- Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968) (federal wagering statutes);
Haynes v. United States, 390 U.S. 85 (1968) (National Firearms Act). Payment of
a tax on illegal gambling activity constitutes in itself an incriminating act, so that no
prosecution for nonpayment or for conspiracy to defraud the government may be main-
tained. Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62 (1968). The Court in all three opinions
was careful to avoid any application of the new rulings to the Shapiro doctrine.
'See, e.g.; People v. Rosenheimer, 209 N.Y. 115, 102 N.E. 530 (1913) ; see also
McCOR IcK 283-84.
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ground for administrative revocation of a permit or license, or termi-
nation of public employment.94 Similar problems have arisen in Japa-
nese law in cases involving (1) revenue laws, (2) alien registration,
(3) narcotics control laws, and (4) traffic laws, particularly in the
context of traffic accident reports.
A. Revenue Laws
Japanese revenue and customs legislation is comprehensive, as befits
one of the world's leading urban and industrial nations. A feature
common to all fiscal legislation is a requirement that persons subject to
taxation maintain certain records and file specified returns." Does the
threat of punishment for failure to file amount to compulsion, so that
all returns are coerced, and does this in turn mean that the contents
are compelled statements obtained in violation of the right to remain
silent?
In the case of corporations there appears to be no problem; most
writers maintain that legal entities (hijin) are not within the protec-
tion of Article 38(1)." But on occasion a private individual may
attempt to invoke the constitutional right of silence as a basis for
avoiding a conviction either for failure to file a return or for filing a
fradulent return. To date, however, the cases, all of which have in-
volved prosecution for failure to file returns, have upheld the constitu-
tionality of the statutes as not compelling incriminating material in
violation of Article 38(1). 7 Whether the contents of the return can be
"See Uniformed Sanitation Men Ass'n v. Comm'r of Sanitation, 36 U.S.L.W. 4534
(June 10, 1968) ; Gardner v. Broderick, 36 U.S.L.W. 4536 (June 10, 1968) ; Garrity
v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967).
Income Tax Law arts. 63, 69, 69-4, 70; Corporation Tax Law arts. 18, 21, 45, 46,
46-2, 48, 48-2, 49; Succession Tax Law arts. 27, 28, 60, 69, 70; Commodity Tax Law
arts. 8, 17, 17-2, 19, 20; Liquor Tax Law arts. 53, 59.
"See KATSURA & TAKEDA 14-15. Under United States law, neither a corporation,
Campbell Printing Corp. v. Reid, 36 U.S.L.W. 4533 (June 10, 1968) ; Hale v. Henkel,
201 U.S. 43 (1904), nor a labor union or other unincorporated association, United
States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944), is within the privilege, though an official or
employee of the above can claim privilege if corporate records also incriminate him as
an individual, Curcio v. United States, 354 U.S. 118 (1957). See McCoRMIcK 262-63.
' See KATSURA & TAKEDA 115-22. A related problem is beginning to emerge as an
aftermath to the Miranda opinion, when the taxpayer is asked to appear at an Internal
Revenue Service office and is questioned about his finances. The decisions to date have
held Miranda inapplicable because the taxpayer is not in custody. Morgan v. United
States, 377 F.2d 507 (1st Cir. 1967) ; United States v. Fiore, 258 F.Supp. 435 (D.C.
Pa. 1966). However, the police officers in Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967),
were not in custody when they appeared in an administrative investigation, yet the
choice between confessing guilt and loss of employment because of their assertion of
privilege was held to be inherently coercive, thus rendering their statements inadmis-
sable in a criminal prosecution against them. The dilemma of the taxpayer is at least
analogous. See Lipton, Constitutional Rights in Criminal Tax Investigations, 53
A.B.A.J. 517 (1967) ; Raymond, Do Escobedo and Miranda Apply to Tax Fraud
Investigations? 45 MICH. ST. B.J. No. 11, 10 (Nov. 1966) ; 43 DENVER L.J. 511, 514-16
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used in a prosecution for tax evasion remains to be litigated, but it
seems likely that the alien registration and narcotics control cases,
discussed below, will control, and that the filing of these records and
official administrative or judicial use of their contents will be viewed
as indispensable to operation of the revenue system. The American
concept of "records required to be kept by law," mentioned above, can
also provide a useful linguistic tool in translation.
B. Alien Registration Law
The Japanese Alien Registration Law requires all foreigners to reg-
ister at ward or township offices if their stay extends beyond sixty
days. At the time of registration, they must indicate the date and place
of entry into Japan and the nature of the visa or entry permit on which
their right to remain in Japan is based.9" The alien is required on
demand to present his registration certificate for inspection by a wide
variety of public officials. 9 It has been asserted on occasion that the
very requirement of registration itself is compulsion to admit criminal
conduct in the case of an alien who has entered or remained in Japan
illegally,100 so that it should not be permissible under Article 38(1) of
the Constitution to prosecute him for failure to report that fact to the
appropriate local governmental office. It has also been maintained that
the requirement that a certificate of registration be presented upon
demand violates the constitutional right not to incriminate one's self,
because the contents of the certificate of registration 10' may assist the
government in proving either false registration or a violation of one or
more of the statutory provisions governing an alien's status in Japan.
With one or two exceptions, judicial decisions, including one Supreme
Court decision,102 have rejected both propositions, chiefly on the
grounds that the descriptive material contained in the registration is
not incriminating or that the information is essential to administration
of the immigration laws. 0 3 There is considerable scholarly dissent,
however.
(1966); Schwartz, Tax Fraud-Miranda and Escobedo Decisions Apply to a Special
Agent's Investigation of Tax Fraud Case Says Florida District Court, 41 FLA. B.J.
337 (1967).
' Gaikokujin tarokuho (Alien registration law) arts. 3, 4 (Law No. 125, 1952);
penalties are provided in art. 18(1) (i).
"Id. art. 13(2), (3) ; penalties are provided in art. 18(1) (vii').
"Slutsunyfikoku kanrirei (Emigration and immigration control order) arts. 3,
70(i), makes this a crime. See KATsuRA & TAKEDA 123.
101 Gaikokujin tirokuhO art. 4 lists twenty items relating to status, etc., that must be
entered in the registration forms.
"Japan v. Nashiyama, Keishfi 1769 (Sup. Ct., Dec. 26, 1956).
" See generally KATsuRA & TAKEDA 123-30.
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C. Narcotics Control Law
The Narcotics Control Law contains elaborate provisions requiring
a record of all transactions in regulated narcotics." 4 Can a dealer be
prosecuted either for failure to maintain the required records or be-
cause of incorrect entries? In this context, too, as in the revenue and
immigration areas it has been asserted that the statutes inherently
violate Article 38(1); the Supreme Court has rejected the asser-
tions.1°5 Though the rationale of the decisions is not absolutely clear,
in one of the leading decisions it appears as if the Court stressed the
absolute indispensability of registration to the system of narcotics con-
trol.' °6 In another0 7 it based its reasoning on the importance of
narcotics control to public health, coupled with the premise that one
who chooses to engage in the strictly regulated business of dealing in
narcotics relinquishes any right to object to requirements of registra-
tion and reporting.0 8
D. Road Traffic Law
The Road Traffic Law requires a vehicle operator to have his permit
in his possession when he drives0 9 and to show it to a police officer on
demand."' Drivers also must make certain reports about accidents in
which they are involved, either to any police officer who happens to be
present or to the nearest police station. Under the version of the Law in
force before 1960, the report was to include not only the names of the
participants, the extent of injuries suffered and the circumstances re-
quiring immediate action to prevent other accidents at the same spot,
but also the "substance" or "details" (naiy6) of the accident; failure
to report was specifically made an offense."' This requirement was
promptly attacked as a violation of Article 38(1). After a series of
lower court decisions, the majority of which upheld the legislation as
constitutional, the Grand Bench of the Supreme Court sustained the
0 . aayaku torishinariho (Narcotics control law) arts. 24-27, 37-41, 70, 71 (Law
No. 14, 1953) ; penalties in arts. 64-75.
"Japan v. Uemura, 15 Keishfi 763 (Sup. Ct., May 4, 1961) ; Japan v. Inouye, 10
Keishfi 1173 (Sup. Ct., July 18, 1956) ; Japan v. Omori, 8 Keishai 1151 (Sup. Ct., July
16, 1954).
"Japan v. Inouye, supra note 105.
"o7 Japan v. Omori, supra note 105.
1 See generally KATSURA & TAKEDA 130-38.
'
0 0D6ro k5tsith5 (Road traffic law) art. 95(1) (Law No. 105, 1960) ; penalties in
art. 121(1) (x), (2).
100 CODE arts. 95(2), 67(1); penalties in CODE art. 120(1) (ix).
'Doro k~tsn torishimariho (Road traffic regulation law) art. 24 (Law No. 130,
1947), and Doro kdtsi2 torishinarihC7 sekorei (Implementing order on the road traffic
regulation law) art. 67 (Order No. 261, 1948). These provisions were repealed in
1960 by the enactment of the new D5ro kotsOho, supra note 109.
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constitutionality of the provision.1 1 2 The decision was reached even
though the report in this instance, in contrast to the other forms of
regulatory legislation discussed above, was to be made to a police offi-
cer who had the power directly or indirectly to move the case along
toward a prosecution for negligently inflicting death or bodily in-
jury. 3 The rationale for sustaining the requirement as constitutional
emphasized the nonincriminating nature of the information sought and
its essentiality to a program of traffic accident prevention.
The problem has been dealt with legislatively. Under the 1960 re-
vised law, the driver is to report the time and place of the accident
and the fact of death or injury if that is the case, together with a de-
scription of the extent of injuries and the scope of any property
damage resulting from the accident." 4 This appears to reflect a legis-
lative judgment that the original form of the law was too broad and
that less sweeping requirements were consistent with fair law enforce-
ment. The constitutionality of the new version seems to be accepted by
commentators." 5
VII. THE FUTURE OF THE PRIVILEGE
It would thus appear that the great bulk of privilege problems that
can arise in the context of ordinary civil and criminal proceedings have
been solved, either by detailed provisions in the codes and implement-
ing rules or through judicial decisions. Though scholars may debate the
desirability of some of these legislative and judicial determinations,
they nonetheless continue to be the law. The four special categories of
administrative proceedings described above continue to present a num-
ber of problems to be resolved through legislative enactment or judicial
interpretation. However, the probabilities are that official restraint in
utilizing special administrative hearings or inquiries, coupled with a
judicial recognition that regulation of the activity in question requires
detailed reports by persons engaged in that special activity, will keep
the solution within the area where administrative necessity and indi-
vidual liberties functionally overlap.
Japan at the present time does not have the so-called "immunity
legislation" by which a witness' testimony can be purchased at the
price of his nonprosecution." 6 Legislation of this nature is not strongly
'Japan v. Sait6, 16 Keishfi 495 (Sup. Ct, May 2, 1962).
'JAPANESE PENAL CODE arts. 209, 211.
"'Doro ktsiiha (Road traffic law) art. 72 (Law No. 105, 1960).
See KATSURA & TAKEDA 138-56, particularly 155-56.
" See KATSURA & TAKEDA 82-84. On the scope of the American law, see Murphy
v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52 (1964) ; McCORMICK 284-88.
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needed as long as the great majority of Japanese evince a respectful
and cooperative attitude toward officials in general, and the public
prosecutor has the power to suspend institution of prosecution and
place cooperative suspects under a type of informal probation. 7 The
principles already laid down by Japanese courts, -together with the
analogies available in American law, are sufficient to enable the Japa-
nese courts to administer immunity legislation if enacted.
The use of administrative tribunals as formal hearing agencies, not
merely as evidence-gathering machinery, is at a much lower level in
Japan than in the United States. As a result, fewer problems of privi-
lege arise in Japan than in this country where intensive quasi-judicial
investigative hearings are often a prelude to criminal prosecutions. In
addition, legislative committees are used less as an aggressive investi-
gating tool than as devices to ascertain personal opinions about the
wisdom of pending legislation. Therefore, it is unlikely that Japan will
experience the rash of legislative committee witness cases that in the
United States have had an unfortunate impact on doctrines of privi-
lege which must be administered in the criminal courts as well as
before free-wheeling committees. Thus, it would seem that present
Japanese doctrines of privilege are adequate to meet current needs.
That there is no burning dissatisfaction with the existing doctrines is
evidenced by the fact that there were no serious efforts made in the
deliberations of the Commission on the Constitution (Kemp6 Chd-
sakai) to reconsider the specific form of Article 38(1). The few ques-
tions raised about that provision were lumped together with many
others to be debated under the general question whether it was suffi-
cient to leave to legislation and court rule most of the constitutional
provisions bearing on procedural rights.' 8
Consequently it is a safe assumption that in major outline and in
most details, the concept of a privilege to remain silent has proven
acceptable both to the Japanese public and the legal profession. Ex-
perience with the privilege supports the premise that features of an
" CODE art. 248; see DANDO 344.
' See KEdge6 CH6SAKAI, supra note 26, at 339-46, and KEMP6 CH6SAKAI, KOKUMIN
No KENRI OYorn Gum, SHIH6 NI KANSURU H6KOKUSHO (Fuzokubunsho dai 8-g6)
(Report of the Commission on the Constitution, Supplement No. 8, on the rights and
duties of nationals) 76-78 (1964) ; Uematsu, Kuroda, Sato & Tanaka, Kempo chosakai
no saishhkoku o owatte (Completing the final report of The Commission on the
Constitution), JURISUTO (No. 303) 10, 16 (1964). This may be because Socialist Party
members of the Diet boycotted the work of the Commission, and were joined in this
by the intellectuals of the left. See also Ward, The Commission on the Constitution
and Prospects for Constitutional Change in Japan, 25 J. ASIAN STUDIES 401, 417-18
(1965).
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alien procedural and constitutional system of law can be grafted onto
a body of procedural law entirely different in origin and can survive
and flourish without detrimental effect upon the form and operation
of that procedural system as a whole.

